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Thinking the Body: Sexual Difference in Philosophy
An Examination of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodiment in
Phenomenology of Perception
ABSTRACT
Western Philosophy, for a very long time,
concerned itself with the task of separating
mind and body, reason and emotion, and
thus men and women. As a result of
women’s disallowance to participate in
philosophy, philosophy remained a faculty
of the mind and women were relegated to
the home. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a 20th
century French philosopher, brought
philosophy back to the body with
Phenomenology of Perception. In this
text Merleau-Ponty offers a universal
account of how humans experience
embodiment. This paper examines not only
Merleau-Ponty’s neglect, but also
philosophy’s neglect of the female body:
Merleau-Ponty assumes that the male body
serves as the universal body, the touchstone
for all descriptions of embodiment.
Jillian Canode
McNair Scholar

John Drabinski, Ph.D.
Faculty Mentor
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Introduction
The project of philosophy has always
been to understand who we are and
what we know. According to many in
the past, the body detracts from this,
and throughout the history of
philosophy the body has been regarded
as inconsequential in the realm of
academia, so much so that there is often
hostility when talking about the body in
relation to reason. Reason harbors itself
within the mind, and because of this,
reason is considered superior to emotion
and the body because emotion is
considered distracting, burdensome,
cloudy, and confusing.
The body became the target of
hostility during the time of Plato in
Ancient Greece. Plato had a theory of
forms and in this theory he postulated
that there exist ideals for every concept,
such as Truth, Beauty, Love, and the
Good. For Plato, we may access the
forms (and truth) through the mind,
which must get away from the body in
order to know.
Following in Plato’s footsteps was
Rene Descartes, a late 16th- early 17thcentury philosopher who reinforced the
break between mind and body when he
introduced the idea of the disembodied
ego cogito with his famous statement,
cogito ergo sum or, “I think, therefore I
am.” This simple assertion achieved a
sort of abolition of the role of the body
in rational thought – relegating the body
to a place where it had no relevance in
philosophical discourse. One of the
consequences of this banishment was
that women were now just as unwanted
in the realm of the rational because they
were seen as creatures of nature and
emotion. Because of this alignment,
women were subsequently affiliated with
the body. They then became mistresses
of the forgotten – inconsequential,
trivial, and irrelevant. Furthermore, their
exile from reason was not the only
outcome of Descartes’ work: many
dichotomies other than reason/emotion
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sprouted. Two of these include
public/private and subject/object.
Understanding the nature of
subjectivity is a crucial issue in
philosophical study. Subjectivity (I will
explain in more detail later) is who we
are as separate from the external world,
but this disconnectedness does not mean
that the outside world does not factor in
our subjectivity. Indeed, if the externality
of the world around us takes part in
forming our subjectivity, so too must our
bodies. Undeniably, the body is the
bridge to the outside world; here
subjectivity and objectivity meet. The
body is fundamental in both ontological
and epistemological realms. Who we are
is not merely a construction or operation
of the mind; our bodies and the external
realm interact with one another, and
how we interpret the data we receive
from our senses constitutes not only
knowledge, but also being. What this
means then, is that if we maintain the
old ideas of distinguishing the mind and
body as two separate entities and
through that make the mind the seat of
knowing and being, we will forget, with
serious philosophical consequences, an
essential dimension of the human
person. As we will see, the human
person is both subject and object, a
combination of the thoughts and feelings
evoked by outside interaction and inner
reflection.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Conception
of the Body as an Agent in the World
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a 20th century
philosopher authored a book called
Phenomenology of Perception wherein he
describes the body as an agent in the
world. As he is the main focus of my
research, it is important that we
understand his theory of the body and
its subsequent effects on philosophy and
society. In his book, Merleau-Ponty
describes how bodies are oriented in the
world through the subject’s use of
perception. The bulk of my research
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focuses on a chapter titled, “The
Spatiality of One’s Own Body and
Motility.” The basic premise of this
chapter states that we take in the world
through our perceptions; in addition,
our bodies are the vital link between the
internal and external. The body is the
bridge between how we operate as
subjects and objects. To explain this
briefly and at the risk of other problems,
we are subjects in that we can say “I”
and know that we mean ourselves; we
are objects as well in that others perceive
us and can say to us, “you.” Because we
use bodily perception to understand the
space around us, how we perceive things
thusly affects how we use and dwell in
space and how we perform as humans
in the world.
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of motility
and spatiality attempts to explain that
how we understand space and move
within that space directly affects how we
relate to our bodies and the bodies of
others, and how that relation, for him, is
a way toward accumulating knowledge:
The space and time which I inhabit
are always in their different ways
indeterminate horizons which
contain other points of view. The
synthesis of both time and space is a
task that always has to be
performed afresh. Our bodily
experience of movement is not a
particular case of knowledge; it
provides us a way of access to the
world and the object…(162)
This passage asserts that as subjects
we must always incorporate and
synthesize our actual view of the world
itself. We are always in motion and
always occupying space, and we must
not accept that taking up of space as a
way of knowing; instead, we occupy
space and move through time so that we
may gain access to knowledge through
this crucial interaction with what
Merleau-Ponty above calls “other points

of view.” This is important to keep in
mind when thinking about the
importance of sexual difference because
different people experience spatiality in
very different ways. A woman’s body in
space will not experience space and time
in the same manner as a male because
traditionally in society males are subjects
and females are objects – meant for
accepting the imposition of the subject’s
will.
Moving toward a knowledge of how
space helps us orient our bodies in the
world, I would like to offer a brief
example: Imagine you are standing in a
room and there is a box in your field of
vision. You begin to understand the
space lying between you and the box by
taking a step toward it or reaching out
your hand and touching it. Through this
investigation of the box, you can relate
this space to your body. Also, you will
manipulate your body in order to make
the most effective use of the space you
occupy. Not only will this exploration of
space aid in your comprehension of
orientation, it helps you “see” objects
around you so that you will grasp
motility. Of this Merleau-Ponty writes:
Consciousness is being-toward-thething through the intermediary of
the body. A movement is learned
when the body has understood it,
that is, when it has incorporated it
into its ‘world’, and to move one’s
body is to aim at things through it;
it is to allow oneself to respond to
their call, which is made up
independently of any
representation. In order that we
may be able to move our body
toward an object, the object must
first exist for it, our body must not
belong to the realm of the ‘in-itself’.
(M-P 160-161)
As we try to understand our spatiality,
our motility, and what these mean, we
incorporate our bodies’ orientation into
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our experiences of the world. As a result
of comprehending the body as in-theworld, it is important that we now
realize our subjectivity comes from how
we inhabit the world through the body.
What we experience directly affects
knowing and being – or rather,
epistemology and ontology.
It is important that I familiarize you
with Maurice Merleau-Ponty so that I
may properly demonstrate the need to
investigate sexual difference. We now
understand Merleau-Ponty’s work is
beneficial because he brought
philosophy back to the body instead of
it being ensnared in the mind. In
addition to work in spatiality and
motility, Merleau-Ponty theorizes about
human sexuality. Layering what MerleauPonty states about sexuality over
movement, we will be able to better
understand why his theories are
problematic.
Merleau-Ponty Assumes That This is
a Universal Account of the Body
Throughout the chapter from which I
quoted, Merleau-Ponty describes the
human subject as undoubtedly male,
and this is clearly demonstrated in “The
Body in Its Sexual Being,” another
chapter from Phenomenology of
Perception. His account of the
neurological disorders of Schneider, a
male patient to whom Merleau-Ponty
refers recurrently in the book, extends
into the effects these disorders have on
his sexuality. What Merleau-Ponty
discovers of Schneider he applies to all
humans. How does Merleau-Ponty know
that what is good for the proverbial
goose is good for the gander? He does
not know, and this is where the problem
of sexual difference arises.
Going back to how our experiences in
the world affect our very being and how
we know, how can it be said that an
account of male being is satisfactory for
application to a female body? Clearly
through our social interactions
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throughout life and our upbringing we
know that male and female bodies do
not share the same experiences. The
most obvious examples of course are
menstruation and childbirth. Different
sexes call for different accounts of
experience; thus the need of a feminist
rethinking of the body.
Judith Butler’s and Iris Marion
Young’s Redescriptions of the Body
Iris Marion Young
In rethinking the female body, we must
rethink all aspects of it in order to
underscore the gendered nature of any
philosophy of the body. In an article
entitled “Throwing Like a Girl” from the
book The Thinking Muse: Feminism and
Modern French Philosophy, Iris Marion
Young, a philosopher, discusses the
motility of the female body and its
stigmas as compared to the malecentered account of human motility as
illustrated by Merleau-Ponty.
What troubles Young about the idea of
“throwing like a girl” is that we do not
examine the factors that would affect a
girl’s motility as related to throwing. It is
almost as if throwing like a girl is a
biological impairment; girls are born
with a certain kind of throwing
capability, and it is our job as members
of Western society to fix them and teach
them how to throw the “biologically
correct” way, like a boy.
Ultimately, Young believes that the
idea of throwing like a girl stems from a
girl’s motility. To throw like a girl
basically means that the person is not
using the body’s potential momentum to
throw the ball; instead one only uses the
throwing arm. Young asserts that this
limiting of movement comes from
societal restrictions placed upon girls as
they mature. Though these are
generalizations, I think it is safe to
assume that many times in a girl’s life in
Western society she will hear, “that’s not
very lady-like”, or “act like a lady”, or
“ladies should sit with their legs

crossed.” A girl’s movement is to remain
conservative, limited to only what is
utilitarian. It is my idea that a possible
result of this limiting, affects how a
woman will conduct herself in the
future. She may become afraid of any
movement that would attract negative
attention to her as perhaps her
movements did in the past – the worst
attention being rape.
Where Iris Marion Young’s account of
spatiality and motility in relation to
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical account
lies on a more practical plane of
application, Judith Butler offers more of
a theoretical approach to Merleau-Ponty
in regards to his chapter on human
sexuality in Phenomenology of Perception.
Judith Butler
Judith Butler supports Maurice MerleauPonty’s theory of sexuality; she believes
it serves a political purpose for feminism
because his account of sexuality bases
human sexuality within a socio-historical
context and point of origin rather than a
biological one. In an article from The
Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern
French Philosophy titled, “Sexual Ideology
and Phenomenological Description: A
Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception,” Butler says:
Theories of sexuality which tend to
impute natural ends to sexual desire
are very often part of a more general
discourse on the legitimate locations
of gender and desire within a given
social context. The appeal to a
natural desire and, as a corollary, a
natural form of human sexual
relationships is thus invariably
normative, for those forms of desire
and sexuality which fall outside the
parameters of the natural model are
understood as unnatural and,
hence, without the legitimation that
a natural and normative model
confers. (Butler 85)
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Here, Butler is critiquing heterosexist
culture, because where there exists an
established norm, those who do not fit
the norm are, quite simply, sexually
abnormal. If we refuse to establish a
singular sexual norm, those who were
once “outsiders” will no longer be
considered illegitimate or unnatural. In
accepting other sexual orientations as
normal occurrences in the world, we
also allow for a greater number of
accounts of embodiment.
Butler examines the chapter from
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
of Perception entitled, “The Body in Its
Sexual Being” from a point of view that
sexuality is coincidental with existence
in that is “referential” and not
“solipsistic”(Butler 87). What Butler is
asserting here is that human sexuality
forms in reference to other beings, it is
not a process taking place solely within
us. This is important to remember
because a normative description of
sexuality such as Merleau-Ponty offers
only speaks from a male reference point.
He neglects to offer a female point of
reference for sexuality and is therefore
saying that all human sexual reference is
the same, just as his account of motility
and spatiality is a universal one. One
cannot declare that there are two
different sexes and in the same breath
claim the sexual reference for both males
and females is the same.
In addition to this, Butler claims that,
“Not only does Merleau-Ponty fail to
acknowledge the extent to which
sexuality is culturally constructed… his
descriptions of the universal features of
sexuality reproduce certain cultural
constructions of sexual normalcy”
(Butler 92). She then goes on to
mention Schneider and Merleau-Ponty’s
description of Schneider’s sexuality and
sexual interest. According to MerleauPonty, Schneider’s disinterest in the
opposite sex indicates his abnormality.
This demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s
slippage into a normative view of
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sexuality, which I will address
momentarily. In “The Body in Its Sexual
Being,” Merleau-Ponty’s description of
Schneider’s sexual incapability focuses
on his disinterest in the sexual object –
the female form. Butler uncovers the
problem in this when she writes,
Central to Merleau-Ponty’s
assessment of Schneider’s sexuality
as abnormal is the presumption that
the decontextualized female body,
the body alluded to in conversation,
the anonymous body which passes
by on the street, exudes a natural
attraction. This is a body rendered
irreal, the focus of solipsistic fantasy
and projection; indeed, this is a
body that does not live, but a frozen
image which does not resist or
interrupt the course of masculine
desire through an unexpected
assertion of life. (Butler 92-93)
One of Butler’s main concerns with
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sexuality
is that, as my project reminds us again
and again, he forgets to acknowledge
sexual difference. Not only does he
neglect this crucial aspect of sexuality, he
creates a contradictory account of the
nature of sexuality. While Merleau-Ponty
states that sexuality is socially prescribed
and determined, he contradicts this
argument with his account of Schneider.
As we recall from earlier, Schneider was
Merleau-Ponty’s patient upon whom he
conducted various tests. These tests
included monitoring his sexual interests
and prescribing normality by way of
showing Schneider pornography,
questioning him about his physical
reactions to contact with women, and
asking his opinion of random women
on the street. The problem with his
prescribing normality is that the norm is
heterosexuality, and positing the norm
as heterosexuality means Merleau-Ponty
states two different points of view.
According to him, first, sexuality is a

social construction and therefore there
are many possibilities as to sexual
orientation based on a society; and
second, heterosexuality is the only
normal sexual practice, where the
woman is the object of male desire.
Not only does Merleau-Ponty
dehumanize female sexuality through
his assertion of it as other-ness, he
assumes through his description of the
body’s spatiality and motility that all
aspects of male and female embodiment
are the same, so female sexuality need
not be elaborated.
Butler suggests a feminist
phenomenology of sorts as a way of
remedying the social situation MerleauPonty created. She writes, “For a
concrete description of lived experience,
it seems crucial to ask whose sexuality
and whose bodies are being described…”
(98). This is such an important question
because it addresses the root of the
problem of sexual difference. If a man is
discussing a body, we have to ask whose
body of which he speaks because his
frame of reference stems from his
experience of spatiality as a male. And,
this is important to keep in mind, not
only must we be aware of sexual
difference when we question whose
body, we must remain conscious of
other accounts of embodiment such as
sexual orientation and race. For
example, an African-American woman
will not experience the world (and
spatiality) as will a Caucasian woman.
To return to Butler though, while
ultimately she applauds Merleau-Ponty
for his declaration of human sexuality as
a historical and social construction, she
prompts us to recall his neglect of sexual
difference and our need for vigilance if
we are to successfully formulate a
phenomenology of the female.
Conclusion
The body puts us back in the world and
it is our bridge to knowledge and being.
Because of this, philosophy must be

Thinking the Body: Sexual Difference in Philosophy

attentive to how context is formative of
the notion of embodiment. MerleauPonty’s account of the body shows us
that embodiment is crucial in
understanding who we are and what we
know; but sex and gender must be a
central feature of the discourse on the
body. If they are not, we neglect half of
the world’s population. It is not enough
that we understand the connection
between mind and body, subjectivity
and objectivity, and how only a
universal body moves and relates to the
world in a certain way. We must not be
satisfied with current modes of thought
concerning embodiment. Philosophy
must account for how women’s bodies
move and are experienced differently in
a fully analyzed and accounted for
social, political, and cultural context. By
doing so, we will open new doors, right
any wrongs that occurred as a result of
neglect, and make unprecedented
progress that will affect not only this
realm of academia, but also all future
scholastic endeavors.
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